Basic Income and Feminism: in terms of “the gender division of labor”

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1. Introduction

In recent years, various life situations incompatible with a welfare state have surfaced, such as homelessness, unemployment of youth, poor single mother households, drawing attention to the reality of social exclusion. In this context, various inclusion strategies to counteract exclusion have been sought as alternatives to the conventional institutions of the welfare state, comprised primarily of insurance and assistance benefits. Basic Income (hereafter, BI) is a policy concept rapidly gaining attention in recent years as one such inclusion strategy.

BI is the concept of an income that is paid unconditionally to all citizens as a personal right based on citizenship (e.g., Fitzpatrick 1999). It is said to be a social concept calling for turning away from a labor-centric view of society in order to break the strong linkage between labor and income. This is because entitlement to BI is completely decoupled from differences in labor. In this sense, it can be interpreted as a sort of critique of the welfare state based on the insurance/assistance benefits model, where paid-work continues to play a central role.

On the other hand, the modern welfare state has long been criticized by minorities, who tend to be marginalized within the welfare state. Objections from feminists are thought to be particularly important. Feminist critiques of the welfare state have been directed firstly at the family model (male breadwinner/female housekeeper model) assumed by the welfare state, and the androcentric concept of citizenship built on top of it. These have extended to critiques of institutions based on such citizenship, and gender division of public and private spheres.

In this manner, proponents of BI and feminists have critiqued the conventional welfare state in their respective contexts. Unfortunately, however, the intersection of the two has seldom been discussed so far. This is probably the reason that the debate on BI, which has started to become more active in recent years, has been criticized for being largely gender blind (Pateman 2006). On the other hand, feminism has tended to view BI critically, trivializing it as "payment for housework" without much further consideration. Due perhaps to such circumstances, there has been hardly any productive cross-fertilization between the two camps. However, if gender equity is thought to be an indispensable policy norm, studying its treatment

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within the new policy concept of BI ought to be important when considering feminist social policy. The present paper thus aims to analytically discuss the "intersection" of these two perspectives.

Below, I will begin by organizing and reexamining the connotations of BI in feminism, as well as the two differing arguments surrounding it—the assertion that BI is “Emancipation Fee” paid to promote women’s liberation, and the one that holds it is “hush money” for the oppression of women. I will illustrate that those who assert either of these arguments for or against BI recognize it as “payment for household and care labor;” however perspectives on the impact BI has on the gender division of roles and of the labor market. In order to illustrate this dynamic, I will attempt to illuminate first whether BI can become “payment for household and care labor” by comparing the two guaranteed income policies which are similar to Basic Income: Caretaker benefit and Participation Income. Secondly, I will assess and in the end offer some insight into “the impact BI has on the gender division of roles and of the labor market”.

2. Basic Income and Feminism
2-1 What is Basic Income?

BI is a scheme to ensure that income is unconditionally paid to all citizens as an individual right based on citizenship. The main features of BI in comparison to existing income support schemes under the welfare state are that it is paid to the (1) individual (2) unconditionally. These features are discussed in turn below. Firstly, BI is paid to the individual rather than the household. For this reason, it may alleviate unequal distribution within the household. Secondly, it is paid unconditionally. Unconditionality in this case means not to question work status, employment record, willingness to work, marriage status, etc. Thus, there is no requirement to take a test such as a means test, work test, behavior test, or the like.

It was mentioned above regarding (2) that BI liberates people from being forced to work in order to survive by decoupling work from income (Van Parijs 1995). However, this orientation of BI has often been criticized with the claim that "BI just gives rise to free riders.” Needless to say, such criticisms are based on reproach towards not working (specifically, not engaging in paid-work in the public sphere or labor market). In response to such criticisms, feminists have asserted that there are more free riders in the private sphere of the home (Pateman 2006; Fraser 1996). They point out that it is the husbands that have been free riding on the multifaceted unpaid work of women in the home. Unfortunately, however, such free riding by the husband seldom appears on the agenda in discourse about BI when the issue of free riding is raised. This reflects the circumstances that conventional discourse on BI has been gender blind and that feminists have not contributed much to BI theory. However,
feminist analyses of BI have at last started to appear in recent years\(^2\). BI is discussed below from the perspective of feminism on the basis of these analyses.

2-2 Feminist Approach to Basic Income

Attitudes towards BI are in some ways divided among feminists. To this point, feminism has offered two differing perspectives regarding the desirability of BI. One perspective asserts BI is a way of reevaluating the economic value of the work women have primarily handled in the past, while also promoting the economic independence of women. This is the school that affirms BI as “Emancipation Fee” paid to promote women’s liberation (Robeyns 2000). The other perspective holds that BI returns women to the home, and contributes to a backlash that runs counter to women’s liberation and independence. This school negatively views BI, and argues that it functions as “Hush Money” (Robeyns 2000). Namely, by receiving compensation for performing household and care labor, women become complacent with the status quo, and as a result often push back against the fundamental transformation of gender relations that is essential to the promotion of gender equality. Below, I will organize these two arguments, and reexamine the strengths and weaknesses of BI for women.

2-3 Basic Income as “Emancipation Fee”

First, what kinds of assertions have been offered in the case that BI becomes “Emancipation Fee” for women?

1) Basic Income promotes women’s economic independence.

This argument first originates in the fact that BI is an individual unit. Under the current guaranteed income regime, women’s entitlements often assist women’s dependence on a husband, against the background of the modern family model and occupational segregation. By contrast, feminists have traditionally asserted that individualized entitlements are indispensable to the exercise of women’s socio-political rights. Unlike the current guaranteed income regime, because BI is an individual unit, it can become a women’s autonomous guaranteed income that does not require a husband as a route (Lister 1990). For that reason, women with no direct economic income can experience a substantial benefit in the area of economic independence (Walter 1989). Furthermore, BI can offer an opportunity to escape domestic violence to a woman stuck in an abusive marital relationship due to economic circumstance.

Secondly, the argument that BI promotes women’s economic independence also originates in the fact that it is unconditional. Due to the gender division of roles and labor,

\(^2\) For instance, Pateman (2006), Parker (1993), and Robeyns (2000), etc. Recently, Basic Income Studies, a journal on BI research, published its first special issue on feminism (2008). It is noted that many of the discussions below are based on these papers.
women are on the one hand excluded from, and marginalized within, the labor market—often becoming workers in unstable and low-income unskilled or part-time positions—while on the other hand they often perform unpaid labor in the household. In these circumstances, finding work is often intermittent due to child-rearing duties, and the maintenance and growth of the quality of personal capital in labor becomes comparatively difficult. In contrast with the current guaranteed income regime, BI views labor on an equal level, and does not tie entitlements to wage labor. Thus, BI can better satisfy the guaranteed income needs specific to women who are in unstable standing in the labor market while performing unpaid labor at home. In this way BI avoids the economic risk women often face as a result of the gender division of roles and labor, and promotes women’s economic independence (Alstott 2001; Parker 1993).

2) **Basic Income contributes the expansion of women’s “voice”, power and bargaining power in social relations.**

Pettit, for example, argues that BI presents women with the freedom to escape from, or choose not to participate in, non-ideal relationships by promoting their economic independence. In this way, BI expands a woman’s “voice” and power in such relationships and offers protection from the damage of violence and authority. This means that a woman’s negotiating power/bargaining power rise in, for example, relationships with a husband in the household, or with an employer in the workplace (Pettit 2007).

Relatedly, Guy Standing argued that BI promotes gender equality in the labor market, and enables males to assume more household duties, thus weakening the gender division of roles and labor by enhancing female negotiating power and encouraging more male part-time work (Standing 1992). However, as discussed later, many feminists doubt this “happy relationship” between BI and the gender division.

3) **Basic Income lessens the “Trap of Poverty and Unemployment”.** (Parker 1993)

As to why this point connects specifically to “women’s” liberation, this “trap” is typically discussed in the context of those whose qualifying circumstances for social entitlements are on the borderline level, and women comprise the large majority of the wage labor that is comparatively unstable and lower-income than full-time, such as part-time work. Because BI does not damage the incentive of wage labor, it turns engagement in part-time work into a more monetarily advantageous this for those women on the borderline. Therefore, it is believed that women whose lifestyles promote engagement in this unstable, low-wage labor in particular could benefit from BI.

4) **Basic Income “de-bureaucratizes” the welfare state.**
As discussed above, the unconditional nature of BI makes various tests unnecessary. For that reason, the bureaucratic surveillance, control and management that accompany tests also become necessary. This is tied to women’s liberation specifically because bureaucratic roles are in many cases defined along gender lines. For example, as discussed by Fitzpatrick, women are comparatively more susceptible to being asked questions about their personal lives and individual activities to the extent that they indicate co-habitation (Fitzpatrick 1999). It is within this context that a norm based on the gender division of roles and labor that says “women should rely on men (income providers).” Due to this gender-discriminatory assumption of women’s reliance, women are comparatively more susceptible to bureaucratic surveillance. Because BI is provided regardless of marital relationship—whether married, unmarried, or divorced—, a bureaucratic intervention into a woman’s choice regarding these relationships is lessened.

5) **Basic Income** eliminates some of the conflicting advantages between women.

Ingrid Robeyns illustrates that in many of the existing welfare states, there are situations in which the advantages of unemployed women, women on maternity leave, and housewives conflict (Robeyns 2000). Firstly, “unemployed women” who are temporarily removed from wage labor are eligible to receive unemployment benefits, while “housewives” who also tend to be removed from wage labor are ineligible. Additionally, when a partner in a dual-income household leaves wage labor temporarily for child-rearing, in contrast with paid maternity leave, a housewife performing similar care labor receives no compensation for that work. In contrast with these situations, whether a housewife, dual-income partner, or unemployed, BI in part solves the conflicting advantages of these categories of women by providing allowance without regards to status.

6) **Basic Income (re-)evaluates household and care labor as a socially valuable contribution** (Jordan 1992; Walter 1989; Parker 1993).

Generally, unpaid labor, and household and care labor in particular, is relatively less regarded than wage labor. This can be interpreted as the presence or lack of economic compensation. By way of contrast, because BI offers monetary compensation to those undertaking unpaid household labor, it indirectly contributes to an economic reevaluation of unpaid labor. However, it is important to note that it is difficult to estimate how much of a substantial reevaluation BI offers for unpaid labor (Robeyns 2000).

**2-4 Basic Income as “Hush Money”**

Subsequently, what kinds of assertions have been offered in the case that BI becomes
“Hush Money” for the oppression of women. In contrast with the multiple arguments offered by those emphasizing that BI is “Emancipation Fee,” the arguments supporting the claim that BI as “hush money” can be summarized in one point. Namely, by recognizing the value of household and care labor and providing economic compensation for it, BI silences women and locks them in the private space of the home, thereby maintaining and strengthening the gender division of roles and labor (Orloff 1990; Robeyns 2000).

This assertion can be divided into the following three points: (a) first, “BI recognizes and values household and care labor”; (b) second, “BI compensates monetarily for that labor (BI is a payment for that labor)”; and (c) third, “BI maintains and strengthens gender division of roles and labor”. Feminists opposing BI most often tie these three arguments together in their assessment of it. However, these assertions differ in their original dimensions, and need not necessarily be tied together. On the one hand, we are seeking “payment” for household and care labor, while on the other hand we can simultaneously pursue the dissolution of the gender division of labor by requesting that men also partake in this kind of labor. Even in the event that the labor is not monetarily compensated, by attaching value to household and care labor, a world in which men and women share in this kind of work becomes more imaginable.

In any event, two things become clear when the argument is divided in this way. Firstly, within the assertion that BI is “hush money,” points (a) and (b) presented above are regarded in the same way. Naturally, payment for household and care labor is easily understood as substantial and visible recognition and valuation of that labor. Within this context, recognition of household and care labor equals payment for household and care labor. However, this kind of recognition and valuation does not necessarily have to be in the form of economic remuneration. If we recognize household and care labor as an activity with socially beneficial value, rather than the payment for it, it is feasible that we can institutionalize a free and universal household and care service. However, that these two points get mixed in the discourse concerning BI is in some ways understandable. That being said, this is because BI is itself a guaranteed income, in other words a kind of economic security. The conflation of these two points is in actuality common in the school that holds BI is “Emancipation Fee,” as well. As a result, a second thing that is clear when argument is divided as above is that the two schools of thought on BI are actually divided on interpretation of (c), i.e. perspectives on the impact of BI on the gender division of roles and labor.

At this point, the following questions must be asked. Firstly, is BI truly payment for household and care labor, and is it the most effective guaranteed income for the objective of that payment? Additionally, what impact does BI have on the gender division of roles and labor? Below, I will examine these questions in this order.
3. **Is Basic Income payment for household and care labor?**

   There is the debate that BI will monetarily reevaluate unpaid labor within the household that the female has been burdened with, by the act of “paying.” As stated above, these types of debates are often seen between feminists who are supportive of BI and those who are against. BI supporters emphasize the point that when labor is monetarily evaluated (paid), not only will the social values of household and care labor be heightened, but it will also stimulate the economic independence of full-time housewives or single mothers who did not have an autonomous income due to being engaged in unpaid labor (Walter 1989). On the other hand, those against BI say that by paying for housework and care labor it will confine the female in a personal domain (housework and care labor within the household) and as a result strengthen the gender edivision of roles and labor (Robeyns 2000). In this manner, as an argument, it may be referred of the possibility of BI becoming a payment for “household and care labor”.

   However, debates such as this misconceive because BI is not payment towards “housework and care labor” in the first place. In order to illustrate this point, I would like to compare Caretaker Benefit and Participation Income, which are often taken up as similar policies to BI. Actually, most anxieties that feminists have against BI are in most cases not applicable to BI but instead to Caretaker Benefit and Participation Income.

3-1 **Caretaker Benefit/ Participation Income/ Basic Income**

   Caretaker Benefit is a means of guaranteed income under the conditions of the performance of unpaid care labor (Alstott 2004). Participation Income, which is more comprehensive than this, is payment that is provided under the circumstances where there is participation in an activity that is beneficial to society, not only housework and care labor (Atkinson 1996). Here, volunteer work and environmental activities, for example, are subject to payment. These policy plans have been supported by some feminists as something that would heighten the status of women who are the largest bearers of care labor by recognizing the value of household and care labor—which has been underestimated so far—and economically rewarding the care providers.

   Compared to this, BI is an unconditional payment, so at a glance it seems to play no part in the recognition of care labor or the valuation of it. Again, BI can be received whether one is engaged in care labor or not. Thinking this way, because Caretaker Benefit and Participation Income can recognize and apply value to care labor by directly compensating it, these policy plans may be imagined to be desirable to feminists.

   However, Caretaker Benefit and Participation Income present the following problems. Firstly, from the characteristics of a payment to a woman for her “contributions” within the
household, if a fulltime housewife tries to obtain these payments in pursuit of an independent income, she will need to engage in household and care labor. In this way, Caretaker Benefit or Participation Income may confine the woman within the household. As a result, these schemes can emphasize the idea that care is a woman’s “work,” and may therefore become a justification of the man’s withdrawal from household and care labor (Pateman 2006).

Secondly, there is the constant issue in the case of providing payment for “household and care labor” or “socially beneficial activities” because “someone” must decide “what kind of” activities in fact constitute those categories. If someone, more likely through bureaucratic means, conducts a payment entitlement test, bureaucratic measures must be taken. Those measures as described are at many times gender-discriminatory and are unfair for females. Certainly, different from a means-test, a recipient of a Participation Income may not be stigmatized as much. However, the opposite may occur and it may stigmatize non-recipients (Baker 2008). That is to say, those who are not able to receive payment can be regarded as not being engaged in “socially beneficial activities.” Within the school of thought favoring BI, there are some that argue if the conditions of Participation Income were relaxed, and the range of “socially beneficial activities” were enlarged, it would be more similar to BI. However, one must pay attention to the paradox that the more the conditions are relaxed and the greater the number of recipients, the stronger the stigma against the non-recipients will be. Moreover, what kind of activities should be regarded as “care/household labor” is not universally agreed; it can be pointed out that if household or care labor is performed in a form that is not familiar to bureaucratic regulations, it may not be entitled to Participation Income. According to De Wispelaere, to begin with, bureaucratic supervision that is needed to evaluate whether one person is entitled for Participation Income itself is an unfair form of power that we must resist (De Wispelaere 2007).

In contrast, unconditional Basic Income is not payment for “contributions” such as household or care labor. BI can be received whether one is engaged in such work or not. Furthermore, because of the unconditionality, it can avoid bureaucratic measures. On the other hand, for housewives who had no independent income whatsoever until then, it will very much encourage their economic independence. For this reason, as Robeyns states, BI may press “psychological affects to housewives” (Robeyns 2000: 126). Thus BI does not directly valuate housework or care labor, but it can be said that it has the possibility of indirectly valuating this. Borrowing Baker’s words, BI is not “payment for care work,” but is something that provides “universal support for care work” by presenting all people with more efficient opportunities than being engaged in care labor (Baker 2008).

3-2 Who should be paid for care labor?
Incidentally, economic compensations for care labor do not necessarily need to grant to the caretaker. That is, it is possible that BI for care recipients is also used for economic compensation for care labor. Furthermore, can’t we consider BI as “payment for care need” than “payment for care labor”? This point has not been often discussed in the debate over BI, but it is crucial when you consider the relations of the gender division of care work and BI. A number of feminists are examining BI payments to children from points of views such as this.

BI advocates, at most times, propose that the amount be reduced concerning a child’s BI. This is most likely considering the “economies of scale” of household and considering that children have much lower materialistic need compared to adults (Ozawa 2002; Van Parijs 1995). Against these proposals, Robeyns suggests that children’s non-material needs, in fact considering the need for care, BI for children should include the opportunity cost for nursing along with the cost of materialistic need (Robeyns 2008).

Actually, if we consider BI standards to be something that must fulfill the basic needs of all people, the appropriate BI standards for children who need special care, as care is something that is included, thus must be set higher than BI for adults. For example, a single mother who has a young child can utilize BI to purchase nursing services and engage in paid labor, or provide care to the child herself within the household and compensate that opportunity cost by using BI. In this way, Baker states that BI standards for those who need care must be based on those needs (Baker 2008). He also mentions that there is the possibility of BI partially reducing the inequity of power that people receiving care often experience.

In this way, BI indeed is not the direct payment for care work but can be “support” for care work. Moreover, it can also encourage monetary compensation for caretaker substantially through a payment for “care need”.

4. How BI effect the gender division of labor?

Next, I would like to examine the point of “what kind of effect BI provides for the gender division of labor.” Until now it has been repeatedly pointed out by many feminists that traditional gender divisions of labor are the cause of social and economic inequality of females. The gender divisions of labor is a system where males exclusively undertake the productive paid labor within the labor market of the public sphere and females are exclusively burdened with reproductive unpaid labor within the household, which is a private sphere; generally here females are expected to economically depend on the male. This system is a norm that strongly regulates our lifestyles. For this reason, even if many females were to enter the labor markets, ultimately in most cases the female is burdened with housework and care labor within the household, so housework and care labor become their “secondary job”. For this, in order to fulfill their responsibilities within the household, compared to males, the female’s relations to
the labor market can become unstable and intermittent. This means, that females are brought to a disadvantage by having been stripped of adequate independent income. This also brings upon woman the “risk of being controlled” while living with a partner and “risk of poverty” after losing a partner (Elgarte 2008).

In this way, when considering gender equality, the focus of examination has been the gender division of labor. Actually, the two arguments around BI are divided to the question of “what kind of effect BI provides for the gender division of labor.” On one hand, BI is said to strengthen the gender division of labor and on the other, BI is said to promote gender equality of labor market and the responsibilities of care within the household. In the following, I would like to examine the two opposing arguments concerning BI and the gender division of labor in detail.

**4-1 Argument that Basic Income will maintain and emphasize the gender division of labor**

BI is said to provide an opportunity for people to choose between paid labor and unpaid labor because it ensures independent income for all people. However, in the present gender structured society, there is no way for such opportunity to function equally for males and females. There is concern that perhaps many males will not decrease/discontinue their participation in the labor market to utilize the opportunity to engage in unpaid labor within the household (Elgarte 2008). Also, under BI, which is said to get rid of the trap of poverty and unemployment, many low-wage workers may exit the labor market. Since a large portion of the low-wage workers are females, it is clear that such exit from the labor market has gender implications.

In this way, if female utilize this opportunity and weaken the attachment to the labor market more than male, the gender division of labor will be strengthened. Additionally, even if those who are exiting the labor market in order to meet needs within the households are only a small part of the female population, their collective adjustments are enough to convince the employer that other females are also damaging willingness to return to the labor market, and might create a “statistical discrimination” to those females trying to stay in the labor market (Robeyns 2000; 2001). If that happens, females will furthermore not be able to stay in the labor market (thus being pulled back to their households), and the gender division of labor will practically be strengthened.

However, these are merely “unintended result” of BI. BI does not aim to maintain or strengthen the gender division of labor in the first place, therefore, it does not actively promote this. For this, many BI advocates state that if we can avoid this “unintended result”, BI can contribute to elimination of the gender division of labor.

**4-2 Argument that Basic Income will contribute to elimination of the gender division of**
Bill Jordan, as an example of this argument, states, “Basic Income that is equally provided to males and females will in the end encourage partial responsibilities of the unpaid labor within the household” and therefore, “make the partition of unpaid labor and paid labor reasonable” that should contribute to elimination of the gender division of labor (Jordan 1992: 172). However, many feminists are skeptical of the kind of debate that BI itself should weaken or eliminate the gender division of labor. Feminists generally think that only when BI is introduced along with another policies that will eliminate the gender division of labor, it will contribute to elimination of the gender division of labor (Lister 1997; Robeyns 2000, 2001; Elgarte 2008; Baker 2008; McKay 2005; Pateman 2006).

As mentioned in Section 2, BI has the possibility of stimulating partial responsibility of care between males and females. However it does not actively encourage males to share the care. Indeed BI will contribute to making more time where the male is liberated from paid labor. However, it does not ensure that the male will spend that time in housework labor (Carlson 1997: 8). Therefore BI along with not enforcing paid labor also does not enforce unpaid labor. Even if BI does not actively strengthen the gender division of labor, neither does it directly challenge it. So, in order to reach gender equality, BI must be complemented with another policy that liberates females. Then, in order for BI to contribute to eliminating the gender division of labor, what kind of policy should it be complemented with?

4-3 What policies should be introduced with BI as a set in order to conquer the gender division of labor?

Elgarte states that BI is a system for guaranteed income to begin with. Therefore, first and foremost, concerning its policy evaluation, it should be evaluated on whether it can successfully guarantee income under a specific circumstance (Elgarte 2008). Therefore evaluating from the point of “whether it is possible or not to conquer the gender division of labor with only BI” would be irrelevant. Elgarte says that the gender division of labor derives from outside of the sphere of guaranteed income—for example, media policies, education policies, or labor policies—and therefore policies in these spheres should be taken to equalize the sharing of roles among males and females. If we want to proceed into a gender-equal society, we must remake all of these policies after all.

Baker also states that the important issue concerning the gender division of labor is in the dominant ideology relating to gender, where care labor is considered to be the female’s role. Therefore, in order to eliminate that, a “cultural change” that makes care labor equal between male and female is needed, and women’s movements should face the issue of this ideology (Baker 2008).
Considering the above, many feminists have pointed out the following concrete policies that should be introduced with BI as a set. This varies widely from work sharing or the reduction of labor time for all people, gender equity on the labor market (opportunity and wage), substantial maternity leaves, periodic or continuous leaves from fulltime care labor, affordable high level care service, education programs that are gender equal, protest against gender-blind media, to changes in the culture and norm of the labor market (Zelleke 2008; McKay 2005; Pateman 2006; Robeyns 200; Parker 1993). This paradoxically states that the gender division of labor has crept into the far corners of society.

5. So, what is it that BI can do for the elimination of the gender division of labor?

For the final part of this paper, I would like to transition to some theorizing. In this paper, I reconsidered the two schools of thought on BI within feminism. First, on the subject of comparing the two policies of Caretaker Benefit and Participation Income, I clarified the connotations of BI for the valuation of household and care labor. Second, I presented the divided thought these schools offer on the effect BI has on the gender division of labor. Further, I illustrated that in order to dissolve the gender division of labor, it is important not to approach the problem solely with BI, but instead through a mix of various policies. This will promote the productive “intersection” of BI theory and feminism that has not been easily visible to date.

As discussed in 4-3, there are only so many things a guaranteed income system such as BI can do to assist the dissolution of the gender division of labor that has so completely crept into the corners of society. However, even given that, I would like to close this paper by exploring what BI can do, and also what kind of shape BI must take in order to achieve have an effect.

In order to do this, two feminist theorists provide valuable reference. The first is Carol Pateman. She argues that the division of the two perspectives of feminism on the relationship between BI and the gender division of labor are “matters of level” (Pateman 2006). Namely, if the level of BI is too low, it could result in the maintenance of status quo or even the strengthening of the gender division of labor. On the other hand, a relatively high level of BI could have a transformational function. She herself offers “a level sufficient for a modest but decent standard of life” as the appropriate BI (ibid.). In her thinking, if we expect BI to contribute to the dissolution of the gender division of labor, our discussion must focus on these levels. If we are able to secure the adequate level of BI, it goes without saying that we would be able to promote gender equality. Additionally, it is imaginable that we could rebalance gender division of labor away from the current male-dominated model.

The second feminist theorist worth referencing is Zelleke. She is doubtful about the
discussion of whether or not BI itself will promote the dissolution of the gender division of labor. Instead, she argues that BI promotes gender equality by seeking the socio-economic conditions necessary to bring about the dissolution of the gender division of labor (Zelleke 2008). From her thinking, we can continue to the conclusion that if BI seeks the end of the gender division of labor by implementation in combination with other policies, then BI will function as socio-economic conditions to bring about these policies.

BI in itself may not be able to challenge the gender division of labor. However, it can bring about one condition necessary for the realization of that goal.

Reference


____ (2001) ‘Will a Basic Income Do Justice to Women?’ Analyse und Kritik 22(2)


